Numa época em que as transformações económicas, políticas e sociais têm vindo a criar à física (e às ciências em geral) um novo contexto de investigação, procuro dar conta do modo como estes novos desafios, que se estendem ao domínio filosófico e cultural, estão a ser encarados pelos cientistas. Num momento em que a "ciência de investigação" ("académica", "normal") sofre uma retracção face à expansão duma ciência "pós-normal", "pós-académica", e em que, ao lado da clivagem entre as "duas" culturas (científica (...) e humanística) uma "terceira", de face tecnológica se vai impondo, aponta-se o risco da concepção duma física "imune" à mudança cultural. /// I attempt to show how scientists are dealing with some new challenges coming from both the philosophical and the cultural domains, in the new context of research that is being created to physics (and indeed to sciences in general) by economical, political and social changes. Now that "research science" (" academic", "normal") becomes less important than a "post-normal", "postacademic" one, and in a time that besides the distinction between the "two" cultures (scientific and humanistic) a "third" one of technological nature is being generally accepted, the danger is shown of conceiving physics as "immune" to cultural change. (shrink)

RésuméĽauteur commence par un bref diagnostic des tendances les plus notoires de ľépistémologie contemporaine, qui trouve dans ľopérationnalisme fonctionnaliste une ≫reponse≪ au paradoxe ?une connaissance construite par transformation de ľobjet et elle relève les indications ≫thérapeutiques≪ qui se trouvent déja dans ľépistémologie de Gonseth, selon lesquelles il sera possible de réintégrer ľidée ?objectivité et de vérité dans la connaissance. En trois aspects: dans le domaine de la méthodologie épistémologique – elle montre que Gonseth s'est aperçu de la valeur propédeutique ?une (...) gnoséologie scientifique, comme condition de base ?un abord cohérent de ľépistémologie . Dans le champ de la gnoséologie , elle montre que la coloration empiriste que Piaget a regretée dans les schémas gonséthiens, selon lui trop ouverts à un contact actuel et extérieur avec ľobjet, fournit, après tout, une indication aujourdi'hui précieuse pour contrebalancer les exagérations opposées ?une gnoséologie qui fait, de ľautoréférence et de la clôture du sujet, ľune des justifications de ľimpossibilité de fonder objectivement la connaissance. Finalement, elle considère que, dans le champ ?une lecture philosophique des sciences, le relativisme dialectique de Gonseth récupere la valeur pragmatique et ?objectivité≫circonscrite≪ de la connaissance, sans pour autant abandonner ľidée ?une progression en objectivité.SummaryThe author begins with a consideration of well‐known trends of contemporary epistemology, which finds in functionalist operationalism a ‘response’ to the paradox of knowledge achieved by transformation of the object . The author goes on to note the ‘therapeutic’ indications already available in the epistemology of Gonseth, which make it possible to reintegrate the idea of objectivity and of truth into knowledge. This is done in three respects. In epistemological methodology, it is shown that Gonseth was aware of the preparatory value of a scientific gnoseology as the fundamental condition for a coherent approach to epistemology . In gnoseology , it is shown that the empirical aspect of Gonseth's schemes, which Piaget found regrettable as being too open to immediate and exterior contact with the object, does after all provide an indication that is invaluable in offsetting the opposing exaggerations of a gnoseology that makes the self‐reference and closedness of the subject one of the justifications for the impossibility of founding knowledge objectively. Finally, it is held that, on a philosophical reading of the sciences, the dialectical relativism of Gonseth recovers the pragmatic value and the value of ‘circumscribed’ objectivity of knowledge, without in so doing giving up the idea of an increase in objectivity. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende dar conta de alguns dos aspectos mais salientes da questão relativa à pertinência da Filosofia (especialmente na qualidade de Filosofia da Ciência) para a prática científica dos cientistas. Nesse sentido, a autora recorre sobretudo a exemplos vigentes nos finais do século xx, dando especial relevância a manifestações de "impaciência" por parte de alguns investigadores em relação a algumas críticas epistemológicas e éticas dos filósofos, sobretudo no que se refere à famosa controvérsia da "guerra das ciências" e (...) a toda uma ofensiva cultural relativa a uma terceira cultura que apresenta os cientistas como sendo os novos humanistas e em que os "filósofos empíricos" estariam a perder peso. Como resposta, a autora propõe que, embora possam ser dispensáveis no laboratório, aos filósofos deve ser reconhecida a capacidade de disponibilizar às ciências uma linguagem que seja capaz de facilitar o diálogo cultural alargado, uma linguagem, portanto, de que as próprias ciências não se poderão dispensar se realmente quiserem sobreviver no âmbito da cultura do século XXI. /// The present article intends to give an account of some of the more relevant aspects pertaining to the question about the importance of Philosophy, and in particular Philosophy of Science, for the scientific work of scientists. The author of the article gives special attention to examples taken from the scientific landscape at the end of the xx Century, whereby special consideration is given to the impatience shown by some scientists in relation to some epistemological and ethical criticisms coming from the side of Philosophy. Particular attention is given to the famous "war of sciences" and the cultural offensive related to the introduction of a third culture in which the scientists are presented as the new humanists and in which even the "empirical philosophers" were losing weight. In that sense, the author suggests that, even though they might be of not much use in the laboratory, the philosophers keep intact the capacity of offering to the sciences a language that is capable of facilitating the cultural dialogue at large, a language, therefore, of which the sciences will not be able to dispense themselves should they want to thrive and be culturally influential in the XXI century. (shrink)